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TEACHERS AS PLAINTIFFS IN DEFAMATIONS:
DETERMINATION OF THEIR STATUS AS PUBLIC
OFFICIALS OR PUBLIC FIGURES
I. INTRODUCTION
Confidence in the public schools has been eroding.' This decline
in confidence manifests itself in different ways. One popular way to
show displeasure with the schools is to criticize those perhaps most
associated with education: teachers.' The criticism usually takes the
form of a condemnation of teachers in general.3 Occasionally, this
public scrutiny has turned from a general attack upon all teachers to
an accusation against a single teacher. These attacks have included
accusations that a teacher is blatantly incompetent,4 that a teacher
exercised unsound professional discretion in the selection of a text-
book," that a teacher hit a student unnecessarily,6 and that a teacher
engaged in illicit sexual activity with a student.7 Such potentially
defamatory accusations, if false, cast an unjustified shadow upon the
© 1984 by David August Sandino.
1. Gallup, 15th Gallup Poll of the Public's Attitude Toward the Public Schools, 65
PHI DELTA KAPPAN 33, 35 (1983). See also Kirst, Loss of Support for Public Secondary
Schools: Some Causes and Solution, 110 DAEDALUS, Summer 1981, 45, 46-47. The 1983
Gallup Poll on education revealed that only 31% of the public believed the public schools were
doing a good or excellent job of educating. In a similar poll taken in 1974, 48% of the public
believed that the schools were doing a good or excellent job. This downward trend in the
public's perception of the schools, however, has leveled off. Gallup, supra, at 35.
2. In this comment, "teacher" refers to an individual whose primary responsibility is to
instruct in the classroom any grade from kindergarten through college. Teacher does not refer
to educators who have gained widespread fame and media attention, for example, by coaching.
This distinction is made to avoid designating teachers as public figures for all purposes. See
infra notes 79-87 and accompanying text. See generally Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388
U.S. 130 (1967); Vandenburg v. Newsweek, Inc., 507 F.2d 1024 (5th Cir. 1973).
3. See Lyons, Why Teachers Can't Teach, 62 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 108 (1980); Vance
and Schlechty, The Distribution of Academic Ability in the Teaching Force: Policy Implica-
tions, 64 PHi DELTA KAPPAN 22 (1981); Weaver, In Search of Quality: The Need for Talent
in Teaching, 61 PHi DELTA KAPPAN 29 (1979); Credentials in Teaching Are Up, But Sala-
ries are Down: Carnegie Report, 65 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 151 (1983).
4. See Sewell v. Brookbank, 119 Ariz. 422, 581 P.2d 267 (1978); Johnson v. Board of
Junior College, Dist. #508, 31 111. App. 3d 270, 334 N.E.2d 442 (1975).
5. See Franklin v. Benevolent and Protective Order of the Elks, 97 Cal. App. 3d 915,
159 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1979).
6. See Johnston v. Corinthian Television Corp., 583 P.2d 1101 (Okla. 1978).
7. See Poe v. San Antonio Express, 590 S.W.2d 537 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
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teacher's professional reputation and may significantly hamper her'
ability to perform effectively in the classroom.
The traditional remedy available to teachers and other private
individuals to rectify an unwarranted attack upon their reputations
is to initiate a slander or libel action against the defamer.9 To suc-
ceed in a slander action, a teacher would generally have to show that
the defamation discredited her character or professional reputation."0
A teacher could recover both general" and special damages"a from a
slanderous statement upon her professional reputation even without
first proving special damages. 8 If the slanderous statement did not
impinge on the teacher's professional reputation, however, special
damages would have to be proven before any recovery would be
allowed."
In the case of libel, general damages are presumed even with-
out a showing that the defamation tarnished the teacher's profes-
sional reputation' 5 and without having to prove special damages.16
Some state courts, however, have placed a constitutional barrier on
libel actions filed by teachers, making it more difficult for them to
recover.1 7 These states require that in libel actions, teachers must not
8. When referring to teachers in general, the feminine personal pronoun is used
throughout for consistency only.
9. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 751 (4th ed. 1971). Generally,
libel consists of a written publication of defamatory matter; slander is usually by spoken
words. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §568 (1977).
10. W. PROSSER, supra note 9, at 758.
11. General damages are non-pecuniary losses like harm to reputation, hurt feelings,
and resulting emotional distress. Id. at 762.
12. Special damages generally refer to out of pocket losses, such as lost salary. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 575 comment b (1977):
13. See Wertz v. Laurence, 66 Colo. 55, 179 P. 813 (1919) (allegation that teacher was
insane was actionable without proof of special damages); Thompson v. Bridges, 209 Ky. 710,
273 S.W. 529 (1925) (accusation that a teacher-principal was immoral was actionable without
proof of special damages); Cavarnos v. Kokkinak, 338 Mass. 355, 155 N.E.2d 185 (1959)
(charge that teacher introduced communist literature into the classroom was actionable per se);
Bray v. Callihan, 155 Mo. 43, 55 S.W. 865 (1900) (statement that teacher was a villainous
reptile and unfit to be with a decent girl was actionable per se).
14. W. PROSSER, supra note 9, at 760.
15. See Siemiankowski v. Paniewiez, 277 A.D. 830, 98 N.Y.S.2d 277 (1950) (libelous
allegation not touching teacher's professional duties was actionable).
16. See Paxton v. Woodward, 31 Mont. 195, 78 P. 215 (1904) (teacher accused of lying
need not prove special damages).
17. See Sewell v. Brookbank, 119 Ariz. 422, 581 P.2d 267 (1978) (high school teacher
was a public figure); Gallman v. Carnes, 254 Ark. 987, 497 S.W.2d 47 (1973) (law-school
professor and dean were public officials); Basarich v. Rodeghero, 244 Ill. App. 3d 889, 321
N.E.2d 739 (1975) (teacher ruled to be either public official or public figure); Johnson v.
Board of Junior College, 31 I1l. App. 3d 270, 334 N.E.2d 442 (1975) (teacher held a public
figure); Johnston v. Corinthian Television Corp., 583 P.2d 1101 (Okla. 1978) (teacher was a
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only meet the common law defamation requirements imposed upon
all private plaintiffs, 8 but must also meet the constitutional burden
imposed by the Supreme Court upon public officials in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan"9 and upon public figures for all purposes and
limited public figures in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.20
To encourage discussion about important public issues, the Su-
preme Court ruled that leading public officials and influential public
figures must prove in defamation actions that the defendant acted
with actual malice, thus making it more difficult for them to recover
than private plaintiffs.2 Whether or not a plaintiff should be desig-
nated as a public official or a public figure is a question of law.22
While not specifying the precise criteria to be employed when classi-
public official). See also Chapadau v. Uttica Observation Dispatch, 45 A.D.2d 913, 357
N.Y.S.2d 296 (1974) (newspaper report about a teacher was granted a qualified privilege).
Contra Franklin v. Benevolent and Protective Order of the Elks, 97 Cal. App. 3d 915, 159
Cal. Rptr. 131 (1979) (teacher ruled neither a public official nor a public figure); McCutcheon
v. Moran, 99 11. App. 3d 421, 425 N.E.2d 1130 (1981) (teacher-principal not a public official
or a public figure); Poe v. San Antonio Express-News Corp., 590 S.W.2d 537 (Tex. Civ. App.
1979) (teacher not a public official); Fleming v. Moore, 221 Va. 884, 275 S.E.2d 632 (1981)
(teacher held not a public figure for all purposes or a limited public figure). See generally
Nodar v. Galbreath, 429 So. 2d 715 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (the court did not reach the
issue of whether a teacher is a public official).
18. The common law requirements of defamation are that the falsehood must be (1)
communicated; (2) understood by a third party; (3) discerned as defamatory; and (4) referring
to the plaintiff. W. PROSSER, supra note 9, at 737, 747-51.
19. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In New York Times, the Commissioner of Public Affairs for
Montgomery County brought suit against the newspaper alleging that he was falsely defamed
in an advertisement accusing the Montgomery police of brutality. The plaintiff was awarded a
$500,000 verdict. Id. at 256. The Court reversed, adopting a new standard for liability when
the plaintiff in a defamation action is a public official. Id. at 283.
20. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). Gertz established only minimum standards that states must
follow to protect defendants in defamation actions. Id. at 347. As a consequence, states are free
to protect defendants to a greater extent than is required by the first amendment according to
the Gertz Court. States, for instance, are free to impose the New York Times standard on
private plaintiffs, although Gertz does not require this. Most states since Gertz, however, have
not placed the constitutional requirements on private plaintiffs. See Peagler v. Phoenix News-
papers, Inc., 114 Ariz. 309, 314, 560 P.2d 1216, 1221 (1977) (nine states have adopted the
Gertz standard for private plaintiffs, and two states have protected defendants to a greater
extent then is required by Gertz).
21. See infra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
22. Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Co., 626 F.2d 1238, 1247 n.23 (5th Cir. 1980),
reh'g denied, 638 F.2d 247 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 962 (1980); Waldbaum v.
Fairchild Publications, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1293 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 898 (1980); Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 562 F. Supp. 201, 207 (D.D.C. 1983);
Velle Transcendental Research Ass'n v. Sanders, 518 F. Supp. 512, 515 (C.D. Cal. 1981).
The rationale for making the public official and public figure determination a question of law
is to "lessen the possibility that a jury will use the cloak of a general verdict to punish unpopu-
lar ideas of speakers, and assure an appellate court the record and finding required for review
of constitutional decisions." Brewer, 626 F.2d at 1247 n.23.
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fying plaintiffs as public officials, public figures for all purposes, or
limited public figures, the Supreme Court has nevertheless drawn
some general guidelines in New York Times and its progeny. The
Supreme Court has not yet had the opportunity to apply these stan-
dards to determine how teachers should be classified.23
The state courts examining the status of teachers as plaintiffs in
defamation actions, for the most part, have not articulated the guide-
lines employed in their analyses.24 Furthermore, state courts are di-
vided in their conclusion as to whether teachers should be classified
as public officials, public figures, or simply private persons.
2 5
This comment proposes specific guidelines suggested by New
York Times and its progeny to determine whether a plaintiff should
be classified as a public official, public figure for all purposes, or
limited public figure in defamation actions. These standards are then
applied to teachers to determine their status. Based on this analysis,
this comment proposes that teachers should not be classified as either
public officials or public figures for all purposes. Teachers may,
however, fall under the limited public figure category in certain
situations.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT AND RATIONALE OF THE PUBLIC
OffiCIAL AND PUBLIC FIGURE CATEGORIES
The Supreme Court in New York Times recognized that the
first amendment does not protect defamatory statements.26 On the
other hand, the Court also stated that "[d]ebate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open. '2 7 The Court was
thus faced with the dilemma of how to balance the need to protect an
individual's reputation with the desire to encourage the robust dis-
23. The Supreme Court had the opportunity to determine if a school principal should
be classified as a public official or public figure, but declined to hear the case. Kapiloff v.
Dunn, 27 Md. App. 514, 343 A.2d 251 (1975), cert. denied,426 U.S. 907 (1976). In Kapiloff,
the Maryland Supreme Court ruled that a principal was a "public figure-public official," but
did not delineate the rationale for this classification. Id. at 519, 343 A.2d at 258. Contra
McCutcheon v. Moran, 99 I11. App. 3d 421, 424, 425 N.E.2d 1130, 1133 (1981) (teacher-
principal is neither a public official nor a public figure).
24. See Sewell v. Brookbank, 119 Ariz. 422, 426, 581 P.2d 267, 270 (1978); Johnson v.
Board of Junior College Dist., #508, 31 111. App. 3d 270, 275, 334 N.E.2d 442, 447 (1975);
Basarich v. Rodeghero, 244 I1. App. 3d 889, 894, 321 N.E.2d 739, 742 (1974); Poe v. San
Antonio Express-News Corp., 590 S.W.2d 537, 540 (1981).
25. See supra note 17.
26. 376 U.S. at 268. Accord Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (no
constitutional value in a false statement); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572
(1941) (libelous statements raise no constitutional problems).
27. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 271.
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cussion of public issues.2"
In its first attempt to balance these interests, the New York
Times Court adopted a standard that made it more difficult for a
public official to recover damages for defamatory falsehoods."' The
Court imposed upon the public official the burden of proving that
the defamation was made with "actual malice," rather than mere
falsity as provided by common law.30 Additionally, the Court at-
tempted to strike an effective balance between the competing inter-
ests by imposing a high standard of proof for showing actual
malice."1
In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,"2 the Supreme Court ruled
that the actual malice standard applies in defamation actions brought
by public figures.33 The Court reasoned that similar standards
should apply to public figures because, like public officials, they are
often thrust into the vortex of public controversies and can make use
of self-help remedies in the form of media access to counter false
charges.3 4 The Court subsequently modified the public official and
public figure doctrine by focusing on the character of the controversy
rather than concentrating on the nature of the plaintiff. In Rosen-
bloom v. Metromedia,"3 the Court extended constitutional protection
to all discussions and communications involving matters of public or
general concern without regard to whether plaintiffs were private or
28. Note, Public Figures, Private Figures and Public Interest, 30 STAN. L. REV. 157,
158 (1977). The author suggested the Court has tipped the scales in favor of protecting an
individual's reputation to the detriment of the discussion of public issues. Id. at 166.
29. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 256.
30. Id. The Court has defined "actual malice" as a publication that was made with
"knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." Id. at
279-280. The Court noted the mere fact that a newspaper reporter did not check her sources is
not enough to show actual malice. Id. at 287.
31. Id. at 286-87. To meet this constitutional standard, the plaintiff must show actual
malice with "convincing clarity." Id.
32. 388 U.S. 130, reh'g denied, 389 U.S. 889 (1967).
33. Id. at 155. In Curtis, two separate libel actions were consolidated. In the first case,
the plaintiff, a well-known football coach, was accused of fixing a game. He brought a libel
action, and was awarded $60,000 compensatory damages and $400,000 punitives. Id. at 138.
In the second action, Associated Press v. Walker, the plaintiff was accused of controlling a
violent crowd at a civil rights demonstration, and leading a charge against federal marshalls. A
verdict of $500,000 compensatory and $300,000 punitive damages was returned in favor of the
plaintiff. Id. at 141.
The Court ruled that both plaintiffs were "public figures" and that the New York Times
standard was applicable to them. The Court affirmed the first judgement, ruling the burden of
proof had been met. However, the Court unanimously reversed the second judgement. Id. at
155-57.
34. Id. at 154-155.
35. 403 U.S. 29, 42-44 (1971) (plurality opinion).
1984]
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public persons.36
This decision, however, was short-lived. In Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc.,8" the Court rejected the nature of the issue as the con-
trolling factor in defamation actions and focused once again on the
status of the plaintiff. 8 The Gertz Court also divided the public
figure doctrine into two categories: first, plaintiffs with pervasive
power and influence are classified as public figures for all purposes;
second, plaintiffs who voluntarily thrust themselves into a specific
public controversy in an attempt to influence the outcome are classi-
fied as limited public figures. 9 Both public figure categories are sub-
ject to the New York Times standard of actual malice.40 In post-Gertz
decisions addressing the public figure doctrine, the Supreme Court
has been reluctant to designate plaintiffs involved in public contro-
versies as limited public figures."
III. GUIDELINES FOR DEfiNING PUBLIC OffiCIAL, PUBLIC FIG-
URE FOR ALL PURPOSES, AND LIMITED PUBLIC FIGURE AS
APPLIED TO TEACHERS
A. Public Official
When the New York Times Court pronounced that defendants
would be afforded a limited constitutional privilege to protect their
statements concerning public officials, it also declared that it would
not "determine how far into the lower ranks of government employ-
36. Id. at 43-44.
37. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
38. The Court rejected Rosenbloom because it would require that judges determine
what is a public issue on an ad hoc basis. Furthermore, a private person would face the same
burden to recover in a defamation action as a public official or public figure but without self-
help remedies. Finally, a publisher could be held liable for a defamation of a public official or
public figure concerning a non-public issue even if reasonable precautions were taken. Id. at
346.
39. Id. at 345. The Gertz Court also postulated a third category, the involuntary public
figure, who has "become a public figure through no purposeful actions of his own." The
Court, however, acknowledged that the "instances of truly involuntary public figures must be
exceedingly rare." Id.
In cases subsequent to Gertz, the Court has apparently discarded the involuntary public
figure category. Comment, Gertz and the Public Figure Doctrine Revisited, 54 TUL. L. REV.
1053, 1092 (1980).
40. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 163-64 (1979).
41. See Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979) (failure to appear before
grand jury was insufficient to bring plaintiff the status of limited public figure); Hutchinson v.
Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979) (scientist was not a limited public figure); Time, Inc. v. Fire-
stone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976) (wife was not a limited public figure because of her actions in a
divorce proceeding).
[Vol. 24
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ees the 'public official' designation would extend."4 The Court later
defined public official in general terms in Rosenblatt v. Baer.43 The
Rosenblatt Court stated that before it would apply the New York
Times actual malice standard, it would have to find that the govern-
ment official was in a position that invites public scrutiny beyond
that of the average public official."" Furthermore, the designation of
"public official" would apply only to public employees who invited
public attention apart form the particular controversy.'5 The Su-
preme Court in Hutchinson v. Proxmire4 recently declared that the
"public official concept does not include all public employees."'47
Under these general guidelines, no definite answer emerges as
to whether a teacher should be classified as a public official. It is
unclear whether a teacher occupies a position that invites public
scrutiny beyond that of average public employees and apart from a
particular controversy. The split in state jurisdictions as to whether a
teacher should be classified as a public official is an indication of the
ambiguity.48
New York Times and its progeny, however, can be read in a
manner that defines public official with precise guidelines. These
guidelines can be used to determine if teachers should be classified as
public officials. The first criterion that must be satisfied in determin-
ing that a plaintiff should be classified as a public official is that her
salary must be paid by public funds.49 This guideline appears to be
obvious, but it is worthy of special examination when applied to
42. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 283 n.23.
43. 383 U.S. 75 (1966) (county supervisor of a public ski resort held to be a public
official).
44. Id. The Court announced that "[wlhere a position in government has such apparent
importance that the public has an independent interest in the qualifications and performance
of the person who holds it, beyond the general public interest in the qualifications and per-
formance of all government employees, both elements . . . identified in New York Times are
present and the New York Times malice standards apply." Id. at 86.
45. Id. at 86 n.13. The Court stated that to determine if the New York Times standard
applies, the status of the plaintiff is dispositive rather than the nature of the controversy.
46. 443 U.S. at 111 (1979).
47. Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 119 n.8. Since the court of appeals did not reach the public
official issue, the Supreme Court did not directly address the issue as well. The Court instead
focused on the public figure doctrine.
48. See Basarich v. Rodeghero, 244 I11. App. 3d at 893, 321 N.E.2d at 742 (teacher held
to be a public official); Johnston v. Corinthian Television Corp., 583 P.2d at 1103 (teacher
ruled a public official). But see Franklin v. Benevolent and Protective Order of the Elks, 97
Ca. App. 3d at 922, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 132 (teacher held not a public official); McCutcheon v.
Moran, 99 I11. App. 3d at 424, 425 N.E.2d at 1133 (teacher-principal held not a public offi-
cial). The status of teachers in defamation actions even differs within a state.
49. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 283.
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teachers. Although public school teachers meet this criterion because
their salaries are paid by public funds, private school teachers do
not. Consequently, if public school teachers are classified as public
officials, an anomaly would result: public and private school teach-
ers, although performing essentially the same job,5" would have to
meet different burdens of proof as plaintiffs in defamation actions. 5
If the employee is paid by public funds, the next element in the
analysis to determine public official status is whether the position is
elected. The justification for this element is that elected officials nor-
mally invite public scrutiny beyond that of typical public employees.
Although this is not a dispositive element,52 the mere fact that an
official is elected may be sufficient to classify her as a public official
under New York Times.58 Teachers would not meet this requirement
because they are not elected, but typically are hired under the aus-
pices of a local public school board. 5'
A third criterion is whether the position requires an official
oath of office." The rationale is that only high-ranking public offi-
cials are required to take oaths of office. Thus, if an official is re-
quired to take an oath before assuming the responsibilities of her
office, this will cut in favor of designating her as a public official for
50. Duncan v. Koustenis, 260 Md. 98, 108, 271 A.2d 547, 552 (1970).
51. Private school teachers would merely have to meet the common law requirements.
See supra note 18. In contrast, a public school teacher would be faced with the constitutional
hurdle imposed in New York Times.
One way to remedy this inequity is to impose the New York Times standard on private
teachers by classifying them as either public figures for all purposes or limited public figures.
The better way to avoid the anomaly, as this comment proposes, is to not classify teachers as
public officials in the first place. A teacher would then have to meet the common law defama-
tion requirements imposed upon all private plaintiffs, unless she fell under one of the public
figure categories.
52. Some public employees, although not elected, may still be classified as public offi-
cials by meeting other elements in the proposed analysis. For instance, the United States Secre-
tary of State, despite not being elected, might be classified as public official for New York
Times purposes simply based on his control of governmental policy. See infra notes 55-58 and
accompanying text.
53. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 283 n.23. In New York Times, the plaintiff was an
elected commissioner whose duties included managing the police department. In determining if
the plaintiff should be considered a public official, the Court noted that his "position as an
elected city commissioner clearly made him a public official." Id. (emphasis added).
54. See, e.g., CAL. EDuc. CODE § 44830 (West 1978). Education Code § 44830 states
that "[g]overning boards of school districts shall employ for positions requiring [teaching]
certification." Id. (emphasis added).
55. Rosenblatt v. Barr, 383 U.S. at 91 n.5 (Douglas, J., concurring). In his concurring
opinion, Justice Douglas stated that it was unclear from the record whether the plaintiff was a
public official for New York Times purposes. Furthermore, it was even unascertainable
whether plaintiff was required to take an oath of office, a factor Justice Douglas would have
apparently considered in determining whether plaintiff was a public official. Id.
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New York Times purposes. Some states require that teachers take an
oath of office before being granted a teaching certificate or license."
Hence, teachers in these states satisfy this guideline for determining
public official status.
The Court, in addition, has suggested other guidelines for clas-
sifying public officials which appear to be more critical to the deter-
mination than are the oath of office and elected position criteria. To
be considered a public official, the plaintiff must have authority to
act "in an executive, legislative, or judicial capacity."5
Teachers generally do not have authority to act in any of these
capacities. Traditionally, executive power related to education is
vested in a state's Department of Education.5" Teachers, however,
neither set state educational policies nor determine local school regu-
lations.59 Teachers also do not act in a legislative manner because
they are not authorized to enact laws. Similarly, teachers plainly do
not serve in a judicial capacity. This guideline is thus not likely to be
met by the classroom teacher. A California court of appeal, in exam-
ining this policy-making criterion, concluded that the control of
teachers over government is "at most remote and philosophical. "60
The Court has also noted that the public official designation depends
in part on the desire to prevent a defamation action brought by a
public employee from being a form of seditious libel.61 The Sedition
Act was designed to stop the publication of material disapproving of
government policy.6 2 The Court has reasoned that allowing govern-
56. See, e.g., CAL. EDuc. CODE § 44334 (West 1978). This section states: "[No teach-
ing] certification document shall be granted to any person unless he ... has subscribed to the
following oath or affirmation: 'I solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support the Constitution
of the United States of America, the Constitution of the State of California, and the laws of the
United States and the State of California.' " Id.
57. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 299 (Goldberg, J. concurring). Justice Goldberg
stated:
In a democratic society, one who assumes to act for the citizens in an executive,
legislative or judicial capacity must expect that his official acts will be com-
mented upon and criticized. Such criticism cannot, in my opinion, be muzzled
or deterred by the courts at the instance of public officials under the label of
libel.
Id. (emphasis added).
58. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 33301 (West 1978). This section provides that "[tlhe
State Board of Education ... shall be the governing and policy determining body." Id. These
governing duties include determining the educational needs of states and to administer educa-
tional programs. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 33032 (West 1978).
59. Duncan v. Koustenis, 260 Md. at 106, 271 A.2d at 551.
60. Franklin v. Benevolent and Protective Order of the Elks, 97 Cal. App. 3d 915, 924,
159 Cal. Rptr. 131, 136 (1979).
61. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 277; Curtis Publishing Co. v Butts, 388 U.S. at 154.
62. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 277-78. The Sedition Act made it punishable by fine
1984]
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ment officials to recover in a defamation action would, like the Sedi-
tion Act, chill public comment about the government.6 3 The Court
stated that it disfavors any judgment which may be construed as a
method to vindicate governmental policy." Applying this principle to
teachers, the question is whether a judgment for a teacher-plaintiff
in a libel action would be viewed as a victory for the government or
as a means to quiet those critical of the government. The chances
that a judgment in favor of a teacher would be seen in this manner
appears to be remote considering the fact that teachers have at most
a tenuous control of governmental policy."
Another element suggested by the Supreme Court to determine
whether public employees should be subject to the New York Times
standard is whether they are granted an absolute privilege to com-
municate defamatory statements related to their formal duties. 6
There are two types of privileges: absolute and conditional. An abso-
lute privilege affords its holder a complete defense to defamation. 7 A
conditional privilege, on the other hand, provides a defense contin-
gent upon the absence of ill will and upon a reasonable belief of the
privilege holder that the defamation is true.68 The rationale for these
privileges is that certain public officials should be free to exercise
their duties immune from defamation actions, which could inhibit
their performance.69 An absolute privilege is normally granted to all
federal officials. 70 An absolute privilege, conversely, is only granted
to the highest state officials, leaving lower officials with only a condi-
or prison to "write, print, utter or publish . . . any false, scandalous and malicious writing or
writings against the Government." Id. at 273-74. Although never challenged, the Court has
presumed the Act to be invalid. Id. at 276.
63. Id. at 278. The Court reasoned that the chilling effect caused by a defamation recov-
ery could be more severe than that of the Sedition Act. Defendants charged with a violation of
the Sedition Act enjoyed full criminal-law safeguards unlike those in defamation actions. Fur-
thermore, the fine imposed by the jury in New York Times was one hundred times greater than
the maximum penalty provided for by the Act. In addition, defendants could face multiple
judgments against them from the same defamatory publications. Id. at 277-278.
64. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. at 154.
65. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
66. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 281-82; Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. at
154.
67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 584 Introductory Note (1977).
68. Id.
69. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 571 (1959). The Court ruled that the acting director
of a public agency was free to comment about the release of employees and was absolutely
immune from defamation suits When working within the scope of his duties. Id.
70. W. PROSSER, supra note 9, at 782-83; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 591
comment b (1977); Christie, Injury to Reputation and the Constitution: Confusion and Con-
flicting Approaches, 75 MICH. L. REV. 43, 45 (1976).
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tional privilege.7 1
The classification of governmental employees for privilege pur-
poses is related to their status as plaintiffs in defamation actions. 2
Thus, if by virtue of her high public office a state employee is
granted an absolute privilege to comment, then she is by analogy
high enough in the governmental hierarchy to be classified as a pub-
lic official for New York Times purposes. Although courts have
granted school administrators absolute privileges to comment about
teachers,73 courts are less inclined to grant absolute privileges to
teachers."' This reluctance cuts against designating teachers as pub-
lic officials.
Although not specifically adopted by any court, the doctrine of
governmental immunity may be of help in the determination of
whether a plaintiff should be classified as a public official. Under
this doctrine, certain public officials are immune from tort liability
for negligent acts they commit when working within their scope of
authority.7 5 Similar to the justification for granting public officials
the privilege to comment, this doctrine allows public officials to dis-
charge their duties without fear of personal liability. 76 In some juris-
dictions, the higher an official is in government, the more likely she
will be afforded governmental immunity. 77 By analogy, it can be ar-
gued that if a public employee is considered sufficiently high in the
government hierarchy to be granted tort immunity, then she should
be considered a public official for New York Times purposes.
If a court considers governmental immunity as a factor for clas-
sifying plaintiffs in defamation actions as public officials, teachers
would have a strong argument that they should be considered private
persons. In states addressing the issue, courts have ruled that teach-
ers are not public officials for the purposes of governmental immu-
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 591 comment c (1977).
72. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 281-83.
73. Christensen v. Marvin, 273 Or. 97, 539 P.2d 1082 (1975) (superintendent's com-
ments about a teacher are absolutely privileged); Barton v. Rogers, 21 Idaho 609, 123 P. 478
(1912) (school board is absolutely privileged to comment on teachers); McLaughlin v. Tilendis,
155 I11. App. 2d 148, 253 N.E.2d 85 (1969) (allegations that teachers lacked ability were
absolutely privileged); Williams v. School Dist., 447 S.W.2d 256 (Mo. 1969) (superintendent's
statement about teacher qualifications is absolutely privileged). See generally Annot., 40
A.L.R. 3d 490, 502-04, 506-08 (1971).
74. Dawkings v. Billingsley, 69 Okla. 259, 172 P. 69 (1918) (no privilege attaches to
teacher's entries into class record); Chapman v. Furlough, 334 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1976) (privi-
lege to comment about student involvement with drugs).
75. W. PROSSER, supra note 9, at 987-88.
76. See id. at 987.
77. Id. at 987.
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nity.78 It follows by analogy that teachers should not be classified as
public officials when bringing defamation actions.
B. Public Figure for All Purposes
The Court has stated that plaintiffs in defamation actions who
"occupy positions of . . . persuasive power and influence . . . are
deemed public figures for all purposes. '79 On its face, the require-
ment of "persuasive power and influence" would appear difficult to
meet. Indeed, thus far lower federal courts have limited the public
figure for all purposes category to a very select group of influential
plaintiffs.80 State courts, on the other hand, are more willing to clas-
sify plaintiffs as public figures for all purposes and have designated
teachers as such.8 It is unclear, however, what persuasive power
and influence teachers are presumed to have. Their primary duties
include selecting teaching methods and materials, maintaining disci-
pline, and evaluating students. It is doubtful that the performing of
these basic responsibilities by teachers is what the Supreme Court
meant by "persuasive power and influence."
An examination of the Court's justification for extending the
New York Times standard to public figures will also prove helpful in
determining whether classroom teachers should be classified as pub-
78. Sansone v. Bechtel, 180 Conn. 96, 100, 429 A.2d 820, 822-23 (1980) (teachers do
not enjoy the immunity conferred upon public officials); Duncan v. Koustenis, 260 Md. 98,
106, 271 A.2d 547, 550 (1970) (teachers are not public officials of the state for the purposes of
governmental immunity); Kersey v. Harbin, 531 S.W.2d 76, 81 (Mo. 1973) (teachers are not
immune from tort liability); Baird v. Hosmer, 46 Ohio St. 2d 273, 278, 347 N.E.2d 533, 535-
36 (1976) (teachers are not afforded tort immunity ); Crabbe v. County School Bd., 209 Va.
356, 360, 1164 S.E.2d 639, 641 (1968) (teachers are not granted tort immunity). See generally
Proehl, Tort Liability of Teachers, 12 VAND. L. REv. 723, 739-42 (1952).
In Duncan, the Maryland Court of Appeals stated: "[It seems that a public school
teacher would not qualify as a public official. A teacher is not required to take an official oath;
• . . is not commonly thought of as an officer or occupant of office; does not exercise sovereign
powers of government. [Consequently,] we hold that a public school teacher is a professional
contract employee of the State and is not a public official of the State [for governmental immu-
nity purposes]." Duncan, 260 Md. at 105-106, 271 A.2d at 552.
Teachers have been granted immunity based on other theories. In some states, teachers
stand in loco parentis to their students and are accorded the same tort immunity granted to
parents. E.g., Kain v. Rockridge Community Unit School Dist., 117 Ill. App. 3d 681, 453
N.E.2d 118, 119-20 (1983).
79. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
80. See Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976) (television star is a
public figure for all purposes); Buckley v. Littel, 539 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1062 (1977) (publisher, author, and television personality is a public figure for all
purposes).
81. See Sewell v. Brookbank, 119 Ariz. at 426, 581 P.2d at 270; Basarich v. Rodeghero,
24 II1. App. 3d at 893, 321 N.E.2d at 742.
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lic figures for all purposes. The Court stated that public figures for
all purposes had to have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased
media scrutiny and public attention.82 This voluntary exposure re-
quirement has been likened to the tort doctrine of assumption of the
risk.83 A public figure who placed herself in a position in which
defamations are more likely to occur should be prevented from recov-
ering unless she can prove actual malice.84
Applying this principle, it must be determined whether teach-
ers, by accepting their positions and teaching in the classrooms, vol-
untarily increase their chances of being defamed as a result of in-
creased media attention. It appears that teachers do not voluntarily
assume the risk of defamation because teaching is a common event,
unlikely to invite increased media attention. Teachers all over the
country fulfill their responsibilities without inviting any media atten-
tion whatsoever. As a consequence, teachers would probably fail to
qualify as public figures for all purposes based on the requirement of
voluntarily exposing themselves to enhanced media scrutiny.
The second rationale for applying the New York Times standard
to public figures is that, unlike most private persons, they usually
have access to the media and other self-help remedies for rectifying
any harm caused by the defamation.85 To be classified as a public
figure for all purposes, such media access must be continuing.86 Be-
cause few plaintiffs have continuing access to the press, 87 this re-
quirement is a formidable barrier. Few, if any, teachers are so news-
worthy that they can command regular access to the media in order
to rebut defamatory statements. As a general rule, their media access
is probably no greater than that of the average private person has.
Because they lack continuing media access, teachers would not qual-
ify as public figures for all purposes based on the availability of self-
help remedies.
82. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
83. Faerber, Defamation, Advertising, and Gertz: Public Controversy and Media Ac-
cess, 1982 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 151, 167 (1982); Note, supra note 28, at 170.
84. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349.
85. Id. at 345. The Court noted, however, that self-help remedies "seldom suffice to
undo [the] harm of defamatory falsehoods." Id. at 344 n.9. A commentator has stated, further-
more, that self-help remedies may not be available, since the publisher has already displayed
her prejudice in the matter, and thus may refuse to publish a rebuttal. In addition, the lack of
competing newspapers within a community lessens the likelihood of a rebuttal. Stocker, An
Analysis of the Distinction Between Public Figures and Private Defamation Plaintiffs Ap-
plied to Relatives of Public Persons, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 1131, 1190-91 (1976).
86. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
87. Stocker, supra note 85, at 1192-93.
1984]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
C. Limited Public Figure
A limited public figure must meet the New York Times standard
only for controversies in which she has thrust herself to the forefront
"in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved." '88 In all
other defamation actions the plaintiff is designated a private person
and thus must merely show the common law elements.89 Despite re-
cent Supreme Court decisions to the contrary,9" state courts have
readily designated plaintiffs as limited public figures.9" State courts
have classified teachers as limited public figures while generally not
specifying the factors they employed to reach their conclusion.9" This
may be due, in part, to the fact that the limited public figure cate-
gory is more difficult to define precisely than the public official and
public figure for all purposes categories.9 3 Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court has outlined a three-step analysis that defines limited public
figure. In the Court's analysis, all elements must be met before a
plaintiff is classified as a limited public figure.
The first prong of the analysis is whether the defamatory state-
ment is related to a public controversy. 9 ' If the controversy is not
public in nature, the analysis ends and the plaintiff is classified as a
private person. At issue, then, is the precise definition of public con-
troversy. The Court has stated that mere public interest in an event
is not enough to consider it a public controversy.95 The Court has
further suggested that a public controversy may be an event in which
media attention can be anticipated.9 6
In Franklin v. Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks,9" a
California court of appeal carefully examined the issue of what is a
88. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
89. Stocker, supra note 85, at 1211. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
90. See Note, The Constitutional Law of Defamation-Recent Developments and Sug-
gested State Court Responses, 33 MAINE L. REV. 371, 380-85 (1981); Note, Whither the
Limited-Purpose Public Figure?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 403, 423 (1980) (suggesting that the
Court has narrowed the limited public figure category to such an extent that it "has been
whittled down to the breaking point").
91. Note, Whither the Limited-Purpose Public Figure?, supra note 90, at 404.
92. See Fleming v. Moore, 221 Va. at 888, 275 S.E.2d at 637.
93. Comment, Gertz and the Public Figure Doctrine Revisited, 54 TUL. L. REV. 1053,
1080 (1980).
94. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345. The Gertz Court again decided to examine the public na-
ture of the controversy as part of its analysis, although it also purported to reject Rosenbloom.
See supra text accompanying note 35. See also Note, The Editorial Function and the Gertz
Public Figure Standard, 87 YALE L.J. 1723, 1738-39 (1978).
95. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 362.
96. Id. See Stocker, supra note 85, at 1214.
97. 97 Cal. App. 3d 915, 159 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1979).
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public controversy within the educational confines. In Franklin, the
teacher-plaintiff selected for her American Government class ex-
cerpts from a book designed to illustrate different propaganda tech-
niques." The court stated that textbook selections made by teachers
for the purpose of discharging their professional responsibilities were
not public controversies because media attention could not be antici-
pated before the books were chosen."9
A second element of the limited public figure analysis is
whether the plaintiff has voluntarily thrust herself into the vortex of
a controversy.'00 The key to determining whether the plaintiff acted
voluntarily is to examine her actions before the defamation oc-
curred.'01 If a teacher is dragged unwillingly into a public contro-
versy in an effort to defend herself, then she should not be classified
as a limited public figure.' 0 2
To illustrate this point, consider the conduct of the plaintiff in
Franklin before she was defamed. After the use of the book was
protested by a parent, the local school board held a public meeting to
examine the merits of using this book.' 3 The mere fact that she
participated in this meeting was not sufficient to consider her a lim-
ited public figure because she had not arranged the meeting and was
only attempting to defend her selection.'0 4
The final requirement is that a plaintiff must attempt to influ-
ence the outcome of the controversy.' 0 5 To determine whether this
element is met, the plaintiff's actions must be examined during the
controversy. In particular, attempts by the plaintiff to influence pub-
lic opinion by way of the media must be scrutinized.' For instance,
in Franklin the plaintiff made no effort to influence public opinion
through the media during the controversy, but merely responded to
98. Id. at 919, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
99. See id. at 931, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 140.
100. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
101. Note, The Constitutional Law of Defamation-Recent Developments and Sug-
gested State Court Responses, supra note 90, at 382.
102. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135 (1979). The Court reasoned that
"those charged with defamation cannot, by their own conduct, create their own defense by
making claimant a public figure." Id.
In Hutchinson, a behavioral scientist brought suit against Senator William Proxmire af-
ter the senator gave his "Golden Fleece Award" to the government agency funding the scien-
tist's work. The fact that the scientist responded to media inquiries in an attempt to defend
himself was insufficient to consider him a limited public figure. Id. at 136.
103. Franklin, 97 Cal. App. 3d at 919, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
104. Id. at 931, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 140-41.
105. Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 135; Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. at 167.
106. Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 135.
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the charges leveled against her.' The court ruled that she was not a
limited public figure.' 0 8 On the other hand, if a plaintiff seeks to
influence public opinion through the media, she would be classified
as a limited public figure assuming the other elements are met.
IV. ACADEMIC FREEDOM: CONSIDERATION UNIQUE TO TEACH-
ERS AS PLAINTIffS IN DEFAMATION ACTIONS
A consideration unique to teachers arises when they are plain-
tiffs in defamation actions involving their choice of teaching methods
and materials. If teachers are required to meet the New York Times
standard in these cases, their academic freedom could be infringed.
The doctrine of academic freedom includes the freedom of teachers to
choose appropriate teaching methods and materials.'0 9 Although
courts have not given teachers a blanket guarantee of freedom to
teach, courts have recognized teachers' right to select methods and
materials that serve demonstrated educational purpose."0 The free-
dom to select methods and materials is founded on the principle that
schools are intended to serve as "the market place of ideas" and on
teachers' professional prerogative."' The freedom to select methods
and materials has traditionally been applied only to college instruc-
tors." 2 This freedom, however, has also been recently extended to
107. Franklin, 97 Cal. App. 3d at 931, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 141. A commentator has
suggested that a teacher should avoid attempts to influence public controversies until after it is
resolved in order to avoid the limited public figure designation. See Beezer, Criticism of Teach-
ers and the Law of Defamation: How Extensive the Shield of Protection? 62 PtI DELTA
KAPPAN 577, 581 (1981).
108. Franklin, 97 Cal. App. 3d at 931, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 141.
109. Kemerer & Hirsh, The Developing Law Involving the Teacher's Right to Teach,
84 W. VA. L. REV. 31, 46-47 (1981). Besides the freedom to choose methods and materials,
authors Kemerer and Hirsh have included the freedom of association and expression outside
the schools in the doctrine of academic freedom. Id.
110. Id. at 61-62. See Beezer, How Extensive is the Teacher's Authority to Determine
Methodology, 63 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 615, 618 (1982).
111. Kemerer & Hirsh, supra note 108, at 51-53. Concerning academic freedom and
the marketplace of ideas, Justice Brennan wrote:
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of
transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. That
freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not
tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. . . . The class-
room is peculiarly the "marketplace of ideas." The Nation's future depends
upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas.
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
112. One reason for only granting academic freedom to college instructors is that col-
leges traditionally serve a different function than primary and secondary schools. Generally,
colleges are places for students to discover new ideas, whereas primary and secondary schools
transmit basic skills. The quality of education at primary and secondary schools may depend
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teachers at other than college levels.11
The Franklin court implicitly recognized that classifying teach-
ers as public officials or public figures could restrict their academic
freedom." 4 Teachers, fearing that they would have to meet the high
New York Times burden in a defamation action, might tend to avoid
controversial methods and materials that could cause a public out-
cry. 15 This fear could conceivably restrict a teacher's choice of meth-
ods and materials to the extent that her academic freedom is in-
fringed and the educational interests of the students not served. A
teacher similar to the plaintiff in Franklin, for example, might avoid
using a controversial book about propaganda in her social studies
class, even though sound teaching theory would require that she do
so. Consequently, the restriction of academic freedom is another fac-
tor that should be considered when determining the status of teachers
in defamation actions.
V. CONCLUSION
Despite Supreme Court opinions defining, in general terms, the
three classes of plaintiffs in defamation actions, lower courts have
not been uniform in their classifications of such plaintiffs. These
courts have extended public official status to plaintiffs with only re-
mote influence in government, despite Supreme Court opinions to
the contrary, and have failed to justify classifications of plaintiffs as
public figures for all purposes and limited public figures. This lack
of uniformity has been especially apparent in classifications of
teacher-plaintiffs in defamation actions.
One explanation for the conflict is the absence of clear stan-
dards defining public official, public figure for all purposes, and lim-
ited public figure. This comment has discussed guidelines for each
category to assist in the classification of teachers as plaintiffs in defa-
in part, however, on the extent of academic freedom granted to teachers at these schools. Note,
Development in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1048-50 (1968).
113. Cary v. Board of Educ., 598 F.2d 535, 543 (10th Cir. 1979) (high school teachers
enjoy academic freedom to a certain degree); East Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 562
F.2d 838, 842-44 (2d Cir. 1977) (secondary school teachers accorded academic freedom to a
significant extent).
114. Franklin, 97 Cal. App. 3d at 924, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 136. The Franklin court
stated that to classify a teacher as a public official or public figure would pose "a real and
intolerable danger to the freedom of intellect and of expression which the teacher must have to
teach effectively." Id.
115. Justice Douglas has written that teachers tend "to avoid 'controversial issues,' to
teach what is 'safe' and generally accepted, and thus [tend] to encourage a mere parroting of
conventional attitudes." W. DOUGLAS, A LIVING BILL OF RIGHTS 66-67 (1961).
1984]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
mation actions. It proposed that before a determination is made, all
elements that make up a particular category be examined. This ex-
amination will determine the proper status of teacher-plaintiffs in
defamation actions.
The guidelines for defining a public official strongly indicate
that teachers should not be placed in this classification. Although
teachers are paid with public funds and may take an oath of office,
they are not elected. More importantly, teachers do not exercise leg-
islative, executive, or judicial authority, and their victory in a defa-
mation actions would not likely be construed as seditious libel. Fur-
thermore, teachers, unlike high government officials , are not granted
an absolute privilege to comment. Finally, the fact that teachers are
seldom granted governmental immunity further suggests that they
should not be considered public officials.
Teachers also should not be classified as public figures for all
purposes. Teachers do not exercise the "persuasive power and influ-
ence" required of public figures for all purposes. Moreover, teachers
neither assume the risk of defamation by accepting their positions
and teaching nor have access to adequate self-help remedies.
A teacher might be classified as a limited public figure in a def-
amation action depending on the facts and circumstances of the indi-
vidual case. To determine whether a teacher is a limited public
figure, a three-step analysis is required. The first step examines
whether the alleged defamation is related to a public controversy. If
not, the analysis terminates and the teacher is classified as a private
person. However, if the alleged defamation is related to a contro-
versy, the examination turns to whether the teacher voluntarily took
part in the controversy before the alleged defamation occurred. As
before, if this step is not satisfied, the teacher would be simply classi-
fied as a private person. If this step is met, the analysis continues to
determine whether the teacher attempted to generate public support
for her actions. Only if this final step is satisfied would the teacher
be classified as a limited public figure.
The court's determination of the status of teachers in defama-
tion actions could infringe the teacher's academic freedom. If teach-
ers are classified as public officials or public figures, and thus have to
satisfy the New York Times standard, their control over teaching
materials and methods may be restricted. This restriction may not be
in their students' best interests. As a consequence, courts should be
especially reluctant to extend public official or public figure status to
teachers in situations implicating academic freedom.
David August Sandino
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DEFAMATION IN FICTION: THE NEED FOR A NEW
TEST
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine an author's dilemma in writing a piece of fiction. On
the one hand, she may find it provocative to use a real life experience
or character to create her fictional story. By describing or portraying
a character that might bear resemblance to a real person, however,
an author risks liability for defamation and exposes herself to the
possibility of a multimillion dollar jury verdict.' Such outrageous
verdicts inhibit an author's freedom of expression. This harsh result
occurs because the present laws of libel do not afford a fiction writer
adequate protection when the jury determines a reasonable reader or
audience might identify plaintiff as the character in the fiction.' This
comment proposes an additional standard for determining the com-
mon identity between a plaintiff and the character in a fiction. The
test should be: did the author use due care in describing the fictional
character so as not to confuse the fictional character with the
plaintiff?3
II. BACKGROUND OF New York Times and Gertz
In the past two decades there has been a revolution in the law
of defamation and the first amendment. In New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan,4 and Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc.,' the Supreme Court ap-
© 1984 by Monica Smyth.
1. In Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., c. 79-251 (D.C. Wyo. Feb. 20, 1981), rev'd, 695
F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3112 (1983), the jury awarded plaintiff
$26.5 million in punitive and compensatory damages. This may have been the largest standing
libel verdict in United States's history. See also Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155
Cal. Rptr. 29, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979).
2. This is the critical element when analyzing defamation in a fictional account. "Iden-
tity" is a traditional element of the tort of defamation and is commonly referred to as the "of'
and concerning" element. The courts utilize an objective test to determine the common identity
between a plaintiff and the character in a fiction. A plaintiff would have to show that a
libelous statement was published "of and concerning him." See, e.g., Fetler v. Houghton Mif-
flin Company, 364 F.2d 650, 651 (2d Cir. 1966).
3. This new standard would apply to the writer, playwright, or screen writer of any
genre of fiction. The feminine personal pronoun is used consistently throughout this comment.
It is not intended to refer to a particular plaintiff or particular author.
4. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
5. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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plied a strict balancing test of the individual's interest in reputation
against first amendment rights of free speech and expression.
Prior to New York Times and its progeny, state defamation laws
for the most part provided great protection to an individual's reputa-
tion. The common law placed great emphasis on protecting an indi-
vidual's "decency" by imposing strict liability on the defendant in a
defamation action. The speaker's intention was irrelevant; liability
was established simply if the plaintiff could prove that the defendant
was responsible for the defamatory statement.'
This aspect of defamation was bound to come into conflict with
the first amendment. The strict liability standard was seen as an in-
hibition on free speech. There was a great dilemma whether the
sanctity of the individual should be sacrificed to attain other socially
valuable goals. Editors were unable to draw lines between those
statements with defamatory potential and those without. The inevita-
ble result was self-censorship and a stifling of "free and robust de-
bate." Such results are inimical to the first amendment.
Thus, the Supreme Court developed new tests to overcome these
dangers.' In New York Times, for the first time, the Supreme Court
subjected state defamation law to a constitutional minimum. Where
a public figure claimed defamation, she would have to prove that the
media defendant acted in reckless disregard for the truth or in know-
ing falsity8 in printing the alleged defamation. This became known
as "constitutional malice." 9 If the plaintiff was a private individual,
this standard was lowered."0 A private individual need prove only
negligence to establish liability for actual damages." To collect puni-
tive damages, however, the higher "constitutional malice" test must
be met.12
While these tests provide adequate protection for the media de-
fendant, they do not give sufficient protection to the fiction writer.
6. Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill, 228 N.Y. 58, 63-64, 12 N.E. 260, 262 (1920). See also
Ingber, Defamation: A Conflict Between Reason and Decency, 65 VA. L. REV. 785, 796-97
(1979).
7. "[Llibel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations." 376 U.S.
at 269.
8. Id. at 279-80. Knowing falsity means the defendant must have known a statement
was false, but printed it anyway.
9. The standard of proof for constitutional malice is "clear and convincing" evidence, a
much higher standard than "a preponderance" of the evidence. Id. at 285-86.
10. "[An] ordinary citizen should [not] himself carry the risk of damage and suffer the
injury in order to vindicate first amendment values." Gertz, 418 U.S. at 392 (White, J.,
dissenting).
11. Id. at 347.
12. Id. at 349.
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This is because New York Times and Gertz left untouched the tradi-
tional element of "of and concerning." Thus, the dangers that pre-
vailed prior to New York Times and Gertz persist today for the
fiction writer.'3 The same policy concerns that led the Supreme
Court to require that state libel laws adhere to a constitutional mini-
mum must lead the Court today to provide a coherent and persuasive
legal theory to protect the fiction writer. A new focus in the "of and
concerning" test could help preserve fiction as a form of free expres-
sion in society.
III. THE NEED FOR A NEW TEST
The problem in analyzing defamation in fictional accounts is
that the traditional elements of "identity" and "falsity" do not work
when applied to works of fiction. Much of the case law in the area of
defamation and fiction centers around establishing this crucial ele-
ment of "identity." Plaintiffs can establish the "of and concerning"
element in fictional accounts with very little difficulty.' The test is
an objective standard: whether the reader or audience reasonably be-
lieves that a character is intended to portray an actual person.'8
13. See infra notes 35-52 and accompanying text.
14. In Geisler v. Petrocelli, 616 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1980), even though the author
painted the leading character in a way very different from the plaintiff, the fact that plaintiff
was named in the book meant the jury could find that the description identified plaintiff.
In Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29 (1979), the court found
the fictional character similar to the actual plaintiff since plaintiff was identified as the charac-
ter in the novel by several witnesses and plaintiff's own tape recordings of several encounter
therapy sessions showed that the novel was based substantially on plaintiff's particular therapy
session. The jury found the requisite "of and concerning" element to exist.
In Smith v. Huntington, 410 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D. Ohio), aff'd mem., 535 F.2d 1255 (3d
Cir. 1975), the use of plaintiff's name was coincidental in the publication of a true story that
expressly stated the names used were fictitious. Because the plaintiff and the fictional character
were the same age and had mothers who were alike, a reasonable person could conclude the
article referred to the plaintiff. (The characterization of the article as "fictitious" precluded,
however, reasonable jurors from determining it identified plaintiff).
In Fetler v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 364 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1966), the court found suffi-
cient similarities between the plaintiff and the character in the novel to establish identity. Both
had large families who traveled throughout Europe in a bus during the 1930's while on a
concert tour. Thus, the court held that it would not be unreasonable for a jury to find that the
fictitious character could be understood to be a portrayal of plaintiff. 364 F.2d at 651.
But see Middlebrooks v. Curtis Publishing Co., 413 F.2d 141 (4th Cir. 1969) (facts sug-
gesting that a reasonable person would not identify plaintiff are differences in age, type of
employment and the fact there are no real parallels to plaintiff's life); Wheeler v. Dell Pub-
lishing Co., 300 F.2d 372 (7th Cir. 1962) (no one who knew the plaintiff could identify her
with the unsavory character because a reasonable person would conclude the that author cre-
ated the character in this ugly way so that no one could identify her).
15. Plaintiff bears a slight burden of showing that:
lt]he libel designates the plaintiff in such a way as to let those who knew [her]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
This objective test is inadequate in fictional accounts for a num-
ber of reasons. First, as it has been applied in the cases, a paucity of
evidence can nevertheless connect the plaintiff with the character in
the fiction." Bindrim v. Mitchell'7 exemplifies how little evidence is
required to prove the plaintiff is the character in the novel. In Bin-
drim the plaintiff, a psychologist, sued the author and publisher of a
novel, Touching, which he felt associated him with a particular ther-
apy practice. The book portrayed a psychiatrist conducting a "Nude
Marathon" in group therapy as a means of helping people shed their
psychological inhibitions with the removal of their clothes. The only
evidence supporting the "of and concerning" requirement consisted
of plaintiffs colleagues who testified plaintiff was the psychiatrist in
the novel.18 There was also some similarity between a transcript of
plaintiff's therapy session and the session described in the novel.
In Pring v. Penthouse International Ltd.,"9 the evidence that
supported the similarity between plaintiff and the character was ten-
uous at best. "Miss Wyoming Saves the World," billed as a "hu-
mor" magazine article, depicted a failed entrant in the Miss America
Pageant whose "talents" included the ability to levitate a man by
performing a sex act on him. Plaintiff, Kimberly Pring, and the
fictional Miss Wyoming both wore jumpsuits, whirled batons in the
Miss America Pageant, and held the title of "Miss Wyoming." Be-
yond these characteristics, there were no other similarities between
the plaintiff and the fictional Miss Wyoming; yet, the jury found
that the plaintiff was the person "referred to" in the story.20
Not only can a minimum amount of evidence be used to estab-
lish the critical element of identity, but a plaintiff can usually find a
friend, relative, or cooperative witness to identify her as the fictional
character. The objective test is unacceptable in another respect be-
cause fiction writers often use real life experiences to create their
stories.
Contemporaneous events, symbols and people are regularly used
in fictional works. Fiction writers may be able to more persua-
understand that [she] was the person meant. It is not necessary that all the
world should understand the libel; it is sufficient if those who knew the plaintiff
can make out that [she] is the person meant.
Fetler v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 364 F.2d at 651 (quoting Miller v. Maxwell, 16 Wend., 9, 18
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836)).
16. See cases cited supra note 14.
17. 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29 (1977), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979).
18. Id. at 70-71, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 29-30.
19. 695 F.2d 438 (1982).
20. Id. at 442.
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sively or more accurately express themselves by weaving into
the tale persons or events familiar to the reader. No author
should be forced into creating mythological worlds or characters
wholly divorced from reality.2 1
Even though courts may understand this to be the norm for fiction,
they still entertain defamation suits involving fictional accounts.
One anomaly that may result is that more than one plaintiff
may identify with the fictional character. For example, other women
throughout the history of the Miss America Pageant may have
whirled batons and worn blue jumpsuits; there is nothing to prevent
any of these women from asserting defamation if she can produce a
witness to testify that she is identified by the character. Similarly,
Paul Bindrim held no monopoly on the particular type of nude ther-
apy practice described in the novel Touching.22 In fact, there were
no physical similarities between Bindrim and the fictional charac-
ter.2" Nonetheless, the testimony of colleagues who recognized Paul
Bindrim in the novel sounded the death knell to the author's and
publisher's freedom of expression since the novel was found actiona-
ble as libelous.
The final problem with the application of the "of and concern-
ing" test is that the fictional text can be manipulated to support both
falsity and identity, sometimes simultaneously. Works of fiction inev-
itably mix fact and non-fact so that some of the text may identify
plaintiff and some may defame her. This situation does not arise to
such an acute degree in media accounts. An objective of news report-
ing is to promote fact-finding and truth. In a defamation involving a
media story, it is usually clear who is the person identified.24 There
is seldom the need to use the same text that identifies plaintiff to
prove the falsity element too. The more critical determination in
suits involving media accounts is proving that a defendant acted in
reckless disregard of the truth or was negligent in publishing the
material.
In fiction, however, the text is ambiguous as to the elements of
falsity and identity. Few cases ever progress to the point where the
plaintiff must establish "constitutional malice."2 Courts have devel-
21. Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prod., 25 Cal. 3d 860, 867, 603 P.2d 454, 460, 160
Cal. Rptr. 352, 358 (1979).
22. 92 Cal. App. 3d at 86, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 44.
23. Id. at 75, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 37.
24. See, e.g., Gertz, 419 U.S. at 326. The defendant here named the plaintiff, Gertz, as
a major "architect" of a plot to discredit local police in Chicago.
25. The only case where a court has applied the clear and convincing standard of consti-
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oped two approaches to overcome the possibility that part of a
fictional text may identify a plaintiff and part may defame her. First,
some courts conclude that it is incumbent on the jury to resolve the
ambiguity. In Geisler v. Petrocelli,6 the court admitted a certain
irony-the virtuous plaintiff cannot prove libel because the defama-
tory falsehood is so outrageous that it cannot possibly identify her.
Yet, she is a more deserving plaintiff because the defamation more
seriously injures her reputation. Thus, the court concluded that the
jury should make the final determination since "adjudication . . . as
a matter of law will seldom satisfy the expectation that legal hold-
ings be consistent and logical.""7
The lower court in Pring also let the jury resolve the ambiguity
that arose out of the fantasy story. Although the story described
something physically impossible in an impossible setting, the court
instructed the jury on the identity element. The court stated that the
plaintiff could recover if it was reasonably probable that members of
the public reading the "humor" article understood that it referred to
Kimberly Pring. The court noted that the character or plot can bear
such a resemblance to an actual person so as to make a reasonable
reader or audience understand a particular character is intended to
portray that person."
Moreover, the trial court in Pring dispensed with the falsity
element, treating the story as a statement of fact.29 Because the trial
court did not instruct the jury on the falsity element, the jury was
able to find liability solely on the objective "of and concerning" test.
A grave risk is created when the jury is allowed to resolve the ambi-
guities surrounding the falsity and identity elements. The risk is that
the jury may improperly determine that the fictional text refers to
the plaintiff. This result may occur if the evidence that identifies
plaintiff (and is thus implicitly true) is also manipulated to establish
that the plaintiff was defamed (but by definition the evidence used to
prove defamation must be a falsehood)."0
tutional malice in a fictional account was Bindrim. 92 Cal. App. 3d at 72, 155 Cal. Rptr. at
36.
26. 616 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1980).
27. Id. at 639.
28. 695 F.2d at 442.
29. Id. at 442. It appears that on pre-trial motion to dismiss, the trial court had decided
the story generally was not fiction.
30. The dissent in Bindrim pointed out that this is a resurrection of the spurious logic
which Professor Kalven found in the position of the plaintiff in New York Times v. Sullivan
which has the effect of endlessly manufacturing defamation. So, for example, those practices
which are similar to plaintiff's technique are classified as identifying. Those which are unlike
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A second approach courts employ is to use the falsity element as
the final determination of a fictional text's defamatory potential. A
court may determine as a matter of law"' that the fiction cannot refer
to actual facts regarding the plaintiff." Thus the falsity element
fails. However, this manipulation of the law and fact doctrines im-
plicitly confuses the ostensibly separate elements of identity and fal-
sity. If it is determined that the story cannot be reasonably under-
stood as describing actual facts regarding the plaintiff, how can the
story possibly identify the plaintiff? If falsity fails because the story
does not describe actual facts regarding the plaintiff, identity must
fail also.
This inconsistency may just be one of the peculiarities of the
law and the anomalous results that certain legal tests produce. There
is the danger, however, that the court is delineating which fictional
accounts will be immune from liability for defamation based on the
degree of fantasy. Consequently, the more non-facts in a story and
the further from reality the characterization, the better the chance
the court will rule for the defendant-author.
This results in more than an ad hoc determination. Rather, the
court arbitrarily draws an elusive line based on the context of the
fiction, creating a problem of inconsistent results. Because Pring v.
Penthouse International described an impossible fantasy in an out-
landish setting, the court ruled as a matter of law that a reasonable
person could not conclude that the story described actual facts re-
garding Kimberly Pring. 3 On the other hand, Bindrim produced the
opposite result. The novel, Touching, was much closer to reality and
further removed from fantasy. Thus, the traditional elements of fal-
sity and identity were established as well as "constitutional mal-
plaintiff's technique are called libelous because they are false. 92 Cal. App. 3d at 86-87, 155
Cal. Rptr. at 44.
31. This element could also be a jury question. See Pring, 695 F.2d at 442-43. When
the decision is taken away from the jury, the problem of arbitrary jury determination
diminishes.
32. Id. at 439-43. After looking to the line of cases that suggested no factual representa-
tion could reasonably be inferred, the court concluded that where the words represent little
more than "rhetorical hyperbole," no cause of action for libel will lie. See generally, Old
Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n of Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974); Greenbelt Pub. Ass'n.
v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970); Church of Scientology of Cal. v. Cazares, 638 F.2d 1271 (5th
Cir. 1981); Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 596, 352 P.2d 425, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 641 (1976).
33. The dissent, in pointing out the weakness in the majority's argument, suggests that
the story does describe "facts" regarding plaintiff since fellatio is the fact attributed to plaintiff.
695 F.2d at 443-44 (Breitenstein, J., dissenting).
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ice," '' which subjected author and publisher to punitive damages.
IV. DANGERS THAT EXIST FOR THE FICTION WRITER
The result in Bindrim reflects may of the dangers that persisted
prior to New York Times v. Sullivan. By proposing the constitu-
tional malice standard for public figures in New York Times and the
negligence standard for private individuals in Gertz, the Court hoped
to address four problem areas: run-away juries, self-censorship, sup-
pression of free and robust debate, and notice to editors and authors
of a statement's defamatory potential. These problem areas are prev-
alent in defamation actions arising out of fiction.
The danger in jury discretion is that juries assess damages, par-
ticularly punitive damages, in "wholly unpredictable amounts bear-
ing no necessary relation to the actual harm caused." 35 Pring v.
Penthouse International illustrates how the jury may use its discre-
tion selectively to punish expressions of unpopular or immoral views.
That the Penthouse article that described the sexual exploits of a
Miss America contestant no doubt shocked the conscience of the jury
was reflected in the damage award of $26.5 million for plaintiff. 6
Another illustration of the plaintiff-oriented jury" is the 1979
California appellate decision of Bindrim v. Mitchell. The court of
appeals assessed $25,000 in damages against the defendant author
and publisher, reducing the original jury verdict of $38,000 compen-
satory damages and $25,000 punitive damages. 8 The dissent noted
the danger of imposing liability on the author and publisher: "From
a constitutional standpoint, the vice is the chilling effect upon the
publisher (or author) of any novel critical of any occupational prac-
tice. [This] invit[es] litigation on the theory, 'when you criticize my
occupation, you libel me!'- 9
Another problem with jury discretion in defamation cases is the
often arbitrary way in which juries apply the legal tests. To begin
34. Bindrim, 92 Cal. App. 3d at 72-74, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 36-38.
35. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350. For example, in Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910
(2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1978), the jury awarded plaintiff $125,000 in
punitive damages after just one week of trial. The alleged defamation was an uncomplimen-
tary depiction of a Spanish author in his association with Ernest Hemingway.
36. The initial award against the editor was $1.5 million in compensatory damages and
$25 million in punitive damages. In addition, plaintiff obtained a $35,000 judgment against
the author. The award was later reduced and still later reversed on appeal. 695 F.2d 438.
37. See Ingber, supra note 6, at 827-833 (discussion of the "jury problem" in defama-
tion actions).
38. 92 Cal. App. 3d at 69, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 33.
39. Id. at 89, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 45.
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with, the trier of fact may have difficulty evaluating "constitutional
malice," especially where the plaintiff appears as the innocent victim
of a callous publication as in Pring.4" A fiction writer implicitly acts
in reckless disregard for the truth, since fiction is the antithesis of
truth. Additionally, the jury may have difficulty evaluating the fun-
damental elements of falsity and identity.4 ' The portion of the text
that identifies the plaintiff may combine with the rest of the text to
defame her. "With any such amalgam of controversial elements
pressing upon the jury, a jury determination becomes . . . a virtual
role of the dice."
42
The possibility of unpredictable jury determinations and exces-
sive damage awards in turn increases the danger of self-censorship.
The New York Times rule has not helped to remove the threat of
litigation,43 and unsuccessful defendants face sizable judgments.44
Moreover, the exorbitant cost of defending a libel suit can by itself
inflict self-censorship, regardless of the likelihood of successful appel-
late courts review.45
As a result of arbitrary analysis by the jury, inflated jury
awards and the resulting self-censorship, freedom of expression in
fictional work is stifled.4 Yet, fiction has been characterized as the
greatest mouthpiece for the expression of ideals. 47 Moreover, provid-
ing the fiction writer with first amendment protection would promote
"free and robust" debate. This "debate" is not necessarily the strict
political debate outlined in New York Times and other news-report-
ing cases, but nonetheless it plays an important role in modern
society.
Because fiction can be characterized as a "higher truth," first
amendment protection can be viewed as particularly important for
the fiction writer. "[T]he quest for 'higher truths' is a broad-based
one that unabashedly subjects the lives of characters-fictional and
40. See Inquiry, "Miss Wyoming Levitates the Law of Libel," May 11, 1981.
41. See supra text and accompanying notes 24-30.
42. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 360 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
43. Ingber, supra note 6 at 833. "A major defect in the New York Times rule is that it
operates at the wrong end of the litigation. In most cases, the rule merely changes the instruc-
tion under which the case is submitted to the jury at trial." Id.
44. Id. at 834. The author suggests that even where chances for recovery are remote,
that plaintiffs may be lured into court by the prospect of windfall damages. Id. at 834 n.216.
45. Id. at 833-34.
46. There may be a greater chilling effect in fiction than in news-reporting. Kulzich &
Hougue, Chilled Bird: Freedom of Expression in the Eighties, 14 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 57, 70,
(1980). See, e.g., Bindrim, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29.
47. R. Burton, The Modern Need for Literature, in FORCES IN FICTION 101 (1901).
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real-to include, at times scathing analysis." '48 Fiction writers use
falsity to arrive at "truth '49 although not the standard truth of fac-
tual reporting revered by the media.50 While news-reporting tells the
reader/audience what has happened, fiction suggests what might or
could happen. Thus, fiction represents a different but significant
kind of "free and robust debate."
The final problem area the Supreme Court addressed in the
recent defamation cases was that of notice. Gertz suggests that the
standard for a private individual if the defamation does not appear
on the statement's face is higher than negligence.51 On its face,
fiction suggests mostly falsity,5" or at a minimum, a mixture of fact
and non-fact. The fiction writer manipulates real life experiences to
communicate ideas in a "fictional" way to arrive at truths. By its
nature, fiction does not warn a reasonably prudent editor of potential
defamatory consequences. As Gertz dicta suggests, a different stan-
dard is necessary where the defamation is not libel per se. Thus, the
courts must adopt a different standard for fiction.
Before proposing this standard, it is necessary to examine what
degree of protection fiction should receive as a vehicle for promoting
free expression in today's society.
V. CONTRIBUTION OF FICTION To FREE SPEECH AND
EXPRESSION
To understand the importance of fiction to the market place of
ideas, it is useful to evaluate other areas of the law besides defama-
tion where individual rights and first amendment values have been
in conflict in fictional accounts. In addition, some insight can be
drawn from observing why courts refuse to draw lines and play liter-
ary critic when reviewing litigation involving fiction and the first
48. Silver, Libel, the "Higher Truths" of Art, and the First Amendment, 126 U. PA. L.
REv. 1065, 1066 (1978).
49. Id. at 1067.
50. Fiction might also be characterized as opinion. Gertz asserts there is no such thing
as a false opinion. 418 U.S. at 339.
51. "Our inquiry would involve different considerations if a statement did not warn a
reasonably prudent editor or broadcaster of its defamatory potential." 418 U.S. at 348; accord
Bindrim, 92 Cal. App. 3d at 73, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 36. A publisher has no duty to investigate
content when the publication comes from a known reliable source and there is nothing in the
circumstances to suggest inaccuracy. Id.
This type of defamation is called libel per quod as distinguished from libel per se. Libel
per se indicates libel on its face, whereas proof that a defamatory statement is libel per quod
requires extrinsic facts.
52. "Every fiction writer knows his creation is in some sense 'false'. That is the nature
of the art." Guglielmi, 25 Cal. 3d at 871, 603 P.2d at 461, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 359.
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amendment.
In the areas of right to privacy5" and right of publicity,54 courts
must balance individual rights against first amendment values.
Often, the individual's rights are outweighed by first amendment val-
ues. For example, in Leopold v. Levin,55 the court considered a
fictionalized book and movie depicting a famous murder, the Leo-
pold-Loeb case. The court concluded that a legally protected right of
privacy may not prevail when balanced against the liberty of expres-
sion constitutionally assured in a matter of public interest. 56
Similarly, in Hicks v. Casablanca Records, Inc. ,57 the court de-
termined that the first amendment protection accorded novels and
movies outweighed any publicity rights plaintiff might possess.5' The
court recognized that a balancing process is necessary to reconcile
two important but conflicting values. However, the court concluded
that the right of publicity did not attach in a fictional account where
it was evident to the audience that the event depicted was fictitious.5 9
In another right of publicity case, a California court discussed
the value of fiction when balanced against an individual's right to
publicity.60 Although the court did not hold that the right of public-
ity outweighed the value of free expression, 1 it did conclude that
fiction occupies a valuable position in the realm of free expression
because it is a "significant medium of the communication of ideas." 2
Courts have never limited first amendment protection to "hot
53. The right to privacy represents the right of an individual "to be let alone". COOLEY,
TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888). The law of privacy is comprised of four distinct types of invasions of
an individual's interests: intrusion, public disclosure of private facts, false light in the public
eye, and appropriation. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 383, 385 (1960).
54. The right of publicity is the right of an individual to exploit his own name and
likeness. Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum, 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953).
The interest protected by the right of publicity is the same as that protected by the tort of
misappropriation.
55. 45 111. 2d 434, 259 N.E.2d 250 (1970).
56. Id. at 254. The fact that plaintiff had been and continued to be a public figure was
also a factor that the court considered. Another court has stated that a fictional account of a
public figure, if not actually damaging to plaintiff, should not be subject to a right of privacy
action. Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 124, 131, 233 N.E.2d 840, 845 (1967)
(Bergan, J., dissenting).
57. 464 F. Supp. 426 (1978). This case involved an attempt by the heirs and assignees
of Agatha Christie to enjoin the distribution of a book and motion picture which described an
incident during Agatha Christie's life.
58. Id. at 433.
59. Id.
60. Guglielmi, 25 Cal. 3d 860, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352, 603 P.2d 454.
61. 25 Cal. 3d at 872, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 360, 603 P.2d at 461-62.
62. 25 Cal. 3d at 865, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 355, 603 P.2d at 457.
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news."6 3 Instead, courts have emphasized two functions of the first
amendment: (1) to maintain the integrity of the political process, and
(2) to communicate and expand cultural experience."' Cultural
awareness may be heightened through the existence of various genres
of fiction that entertain the public. 65 Entertainment has been granted
the same constitutional protection as the exposition of ideas because
"the line between the informing and the entertaining is too elu-
sive." 6 6 What is fundamental is that entertainment is a mode of self-
expression, notwithstanding its contribution to the market place of
ideas."'
Courts are unwilling to play literary critic in the courtroom be-
cause what seems of no value to some may have fleeting or enduring
value for others.6 8 "It is fundamental that courts may not muffle ex-
pression by passing judgment on its skill or clumsiness, its sensitivity
or coarseness; nor on whether it pains or pleases."6 9 Thus, even the
humor article that appeared in Penthouse inspiring the Pring litiga-
tion is entitled to some first amendment protection.7" For whenever
there is an attempt to suppress particular words, there is a danger in
suppressing certain ideas in the process.71
VI. No ABSOLUTE FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION FOR
FICTION
If courts recognize the unqualified value of protecting fictional
works as a means of self-expression, and if outrageous results occur
63. Mistrot v. True Detective Publishing Corp., 467 F.2d 122, 124 (5th Cir. 1972).
64. Felcher & Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayal of Real People by the Me-
dia, 88 YALE L.J. 1577, 1597 (1979).
65. Novels and other fictional genres have been used to criticize and satirize political
and social views throughout history. For example, Dostoyevsky's novels are critical of Tsarist
Russia and the class system during the mid-19th century; but because the criticism was ex-
pressed through literature, it was less susceptible to government censorship.
66. Guglielmi, 25 Cal. 3d at 867, 603 P.2d at 459, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 357 (citing Win-
ters v. New York, 333 U.S., 507, 510 (1948)); Leopold v. Levin, 45 I11. 2d at 438, 259 N.E.2d
at 254 (1970).
67. Guglielmi, 25 Cal. 3d at 867, 603 P.2d at 458, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
68. University of Notre Dame du Lac v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 256
N.Y.S.2d 301, 307, 22 A.D. 452, 458, (1965) aff'd, 207 N.E.2d 508 (1965). See e.g. Pring,
695 F.2d 438.
69. Notre Dame, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 307, 22 A.D. at 458. (quoting Berlin v. E.C. Publica-
tions, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir. 1964) cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964)).
70. "The First Amendment is not limited to ideas, statements, or positions which are
accepted; which are not outrageous; which are decent and popular; which are constructive or
have some redeeming element; or which do not deviate from community standards and norms
.Pring, 695 F.2d at 443.
71. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).
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when fictional accounts are subjected to libel actions, then why not
grant fiction absolute first amendment protection?
To begin with, case law is clearly opposed to this result. Since
New York Times and Gertz, cases have unequivocally established
that fiction shall not be granted absolute first amendment protection.
In Miss America Pageant v. Penthouse International Ltd.,72 the
court expressly stated that first amendment protection is not absolute
for works of parody and satire." Earlier, in Bindrim, the court as-
serted that the fictional aspect of the novel, Touching, would not in-
sulate the defendant author from liability for libel if all the elements
of libel were present.74 The court found that the label "fiction" is not
decisive of what readers or an audience reasonably understand about
the fictional characterization. This label is, however, one factor the
jury considers in determining whether readers understand the fiction
to be "of and concerning" the plaintiff.75
Moreover, granting fiction absolute first amendment protection
presents many dangers. Fiction could be manipulated as a vehicle for
irresponsible defamatory writing. Authors and publishers would
have carte blanche to defame at will. For example, had the story in
the Pring litigation contained less "fantasy" or had it named the
plaintiff, Kimberly Pring, rather than characterizing the character as
Miss Wyoming, the plaintiff might have been a more deserving
victor. The first amendment would not provide absolute protection
when an individual's reputation is maligned.
Establishing absolute first amendment protection for fiction also
suggests definitional problems. First, writers and publishers might
label all their expressions "fiction" in hope of complete immunity.
Perhaps this problem could be solved by rules circumscribing the
medium of fiction. 76 For example, courts could distinguish fiction
which is factual with the goal of informing from fiction which is
imagined with the goal of enlightening. 77 However, such a delinea-
72. 524 F. Supp. 1280 (D.N.J. 1981).
73. Instead, the court insisted a distinction between fiction and reality will not resolve
the question of whether an author or publisher acted in reckless disregard for the truth. Id. at
1286.
74. 92 Cal. App. 3d at 73 n.2, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 35 n.2. However in Pring, the dissent-
ing opinion urged that the defendant should not escape liability by relying on the fantasy used
to embellish the fact. Pring, 695 F.2d at 443-45 (Breitenstein, J., dissenting). Also, in Smith v.
Huntington Publishing Co., 410 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D. Ohio 1975), the court held differently.
Because the article in question stated that it was fictitious, the court concluded that no reasona-
ble person could believe that it was about the plaintiff. Id. at 1273.
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564 comment (d), (1977).
76. See Silver, supra note 47, at 592-93.
77. Id.
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tion is unworkable. If courts decline to play literary critic, they can
hardly be expected to draw lines between what informs and what
entertains. The law already refuses to draw the "elusive line" when
it comes to the first amendment.78 Any standard for determining
what is more "fact" or more "fiction" would be too ambiguous for
either judges or juries to determine.
The evolution of defamation from its strict liability standard in-
dicates that there will never be any "absolute rules." While New
York Times gave protection to media members who allegedly defame
public officials and public figures, Gertz then circumscribed these
broad protections. 9 By requiring that private individuals need only
show defendant's conduct was negligent rather than reckless, Gertz
eased the burden of proof and shifted the pendulum back toward
strict liability. The New York Times and Gertz dichotomy leads to
case by case balancing. This may, in fact, be the best first amend-
ment methodology; its flexibility adapts to the various rights and val-
ues in controversy during any one period of time.
Both the previous case precedent in defamation and the disposi-
tion of current members of the bench indicate that first amendment
protection is not a realistic approach. Interpretations of New York
Times and Gertz may be inherently political, 80 representing free
press rather than free speech policy interests.81 Fiction fails to fit
conveniently into the political mold unless it is characterized as a
"higher truth." While some have characterized fiction in this man-
ner, judges faced with this issue today may not.
Moreover, although some characterize "fiction" as a "higher
truth," the judges who sit on the bench may not. The litigation sur-
rounding the Penthouse article may typify this dilemma. The major-
ity admitted that "the gross nature of the article here concerned
makes an objective analysis of the law difficult."82 Though the Pent-
house article can hardly be called a "classic" in literary prose, its
78. Guglielmi, 25 Cal. 3d at 867, 603 P.2d at 459, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
79. "The need to avoid self-censorship by the news media is, however, not the only
societal value at issue." Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341.
80. Ingber, supra note 6, at 808. One of the concurring justices in New York Times
argued that purely private defamation is not protected under the first amendment because it
has little to do with the political ends of a self-governing society. "The imposition of liability
for private defamation does not abridge the freedom of public speech or any other freedoms
protected by the first amendment." New York Times, 376 U.S. at 301-02 (Goldberg, J.
concurring).
81. Frakt, The Evolving Law of Defamation: New York Times v. Sullivan to Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond, 6 RUTGERS L. REv. 471, 508 (1975).
82. Pring, 695 F.2d at 443.
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satirical value may be worth noting, as the article critiques both the
Miss America Pageant and a "young girl's American dream" to hold
the coveted title of "Miss America." Nevertheless, it is doubtful that
courts will give Penthouse magazine absolute first amendment pro-
tection when a person's reputation has been threatened in this
manner.
VII. A PROPOSAL FOR A NEW TEST To DETERMINE "OF AND
CONCERNING" IN DEFAMATION ACTIONS
The traditional element of "identity" is ineffective in establish-
ing that a fictional characterization is "of and concerning" a plain-
tiff. The focus on what a reasonable person would conclude provides
only minimal protection to the fiction writer. It prevents the plaintiff
who claims she sees herself in the fictional characterization and from
establishing a libel cause of action on this basis alone.8 3
However, the focus on the reasonable reader does not go far
enough. This standard completely ignores the nature of the author's
conduct in describing the fictional character. By refusing to address
the author's conduct, the court is holding an author strictly liable for
whatever she writes, as long as a reasonable jury understands that
the fictionalization identifies the plaintiff. A paucity of evidence often
determines what the reasonable reader concludes; the evidence used
to identify plaintiff may also be used to establish falsity. Thus, it is
only equitable and fair to examine the author's conduct when creat-
ing the fictional character. The question then becomes: to what stan-
dard of conduct should the author be held?
The standard of "intent" might be too difficult a burden for any
plaintiff to prove. 4 Convincing evidence may establish that an au-
thor actually "aimed or intended" her fiction to refer to the plaintiff.
However, individual authors may escape this standard by simply de-
nying that they intentionally identified the plaintiff as the character
in the book or movie. Moreover, fiction often consists of an inte-
grated mixture of fact and non-fact. By implication, this mixture
suggests that the author did not "intend" to identify the plaintiff.
Had an author "intended" to identify the plaintiff in her character
she would not have comingled fact and fantasy.
83. The mere fact that the plaintiff produced witnesses who testified as to their belief
that the character portrayed in the fictional story was plaintiff was not enough to establish "of
and concerning." United States v. Miles, 34, 39 (Cir. 1979).
84. One court has expressly rejected this standard. In Bindrm, the court found it was
not error to fail to charge the jury that there be clear and convincing evidence defendant inten-
tionally identified plaintiff. 92 Cal. App. 3d at 79, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 39.
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A better standard for establishing liability is negligence. The
courts should ask: did the author use reasonable care in identifying
the character in the fiction so as not to confuse the plaintiff with the
character in the fiction?85 A minimum mens rea of negligence will
better serve the goals of New York Times: (1) to encourage free and
robust debate; (2) to mitigate high jury awards; and (3) to eliminate
self-censorship. By increasing the minimum standard from strict lia-
bility to negligence, it becomes more difficult for a plaintiff to bring a
successful libel cause of action against a work of fiction. The number
of plaintiff-victories in defamation actions will decrease and thus,
large jury awards will be less prevalent.
The trier of fact will determine whether or not the author used
reasonable care in identifying the character in her fictional work. 6
The risk of some arbitrary determinations still exists, but the likeli-
hood of a plaintiff establishing that an author fell below the standard
of care of other authors in a similar position will decrease. An au-
thor can escape liability by showing she utilized due care not to con-
fuse plaintiff and the fictional character. An author can furthur show
that she described the fictional character using different physical at-
tributes, a different name, and avoided clear parallels between
fictional and real events.8 7 Or an author might successfully prove it
is a legitimate literary technique to portray a character in an outra-
geous or ugly way so as not to confuse the character and the plain-
tiff. But it is really the fact that the plaintiff bears the burden of
proving breach of a duty that will help shield the fiction writer from
liability.88 Thus, the threat of high jury awards and resulting self-
censorship diminishes.
A negligence standard would be in accord with the Gertz hold-
ing, which requires that a private individual prove the media-defen-
dant was negligent in publishing the defamatory falsehood. When
85. This test does not delineate between public and private figures as the other defama-
tion tests do. The different status of a plaintiff may however influence the analysis of the
author's negligence in describing the characters in the fiction.
86. Presumably, an author would have to at least know of the plaintiff in order for a
court to examine an author's conduct regarding the description of the fictional character and
the plaintiff.
87. In a right of privacy action, an author demonstrated a deliberate attempt to create
the fictional character wholly divorced from plaintiff as a literary technique. But this did not
shield defendant-author from liability. Spahn v. Julizn Messner, Ltd., 233 N.E.2d 840, 21
N.Y.2d 124 (1967). Compare Wheeler v. Dell Publishing Co., 300 F.2d 372 (Cir. 1962),
where author created fictional character in an unsavory way so as not to identify plaintiff. In
this defamation action, the court determined the fiction was not actionable as libelous.
88. This will be a more difficult burden than just gathering evidence and witnesses to
prove a reasonable person would identify plaintiff with the fictional character.
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balancing first amendment rights against reputation, the courts have
been unequivocal in preferring negligence over strict liability as the
proper standard to apply to defendants' conduct.
The negligence standard also satisfies the Court's concern that
publishers and authors will be forced to exercise self-censorship
without notice of a statement's defamatory potential. The problem of
notice lessens when an author uses the requisite degree of care.
Thus, if an author uses precautions in describing a fictional charac-
ter, there can be no "surprises" to a reasonably prudent editor as to
the defamatory nature of the statement. If the author's conduct is
relevant to the identity element in a defamation cause of action, an
editor need only monitor the steps the author took in order to meet
her duty of due care.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The present laws of libel cannot be viewed in a vacuum. They
are nothing more than conceptualizations that fit particular circum-
stances. The same factors that led the Court in New York Times to
adopt a different standard for media-defendants, must lead the Court
today to articulate a new test for the fiction writer-defendant. The
failure of present legal analysis to consider the fiction writer's free-
dom of expression along with problems of self-censorship can only be
remedied by altering the "of and concerning" test, focusing on the
author's conduct. A negligence standard will help insure first amend-
ment protection for those who create the "higher truths" in our
society.
Monica Smyth
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